And I think this aspect epitomizes an inextricable part of his personality and long-time experience as an international lawyer deeply rooted in theory and practice alike, and it has, I may say, strongly infl uenced my own thinking and understanding of international law. It is Professor Zemanek's pragmatic attitude towards the possibilities and realities of the international legal system and his awareness of the limits of international law. He has always called for a healthy dose of pragmatic realism in assessing issues of international law, especially in those areas where international law is not equipped with the necessary structural conditions. In the Kosovo discussion, for instance, Professor Zemanek -whilst defending the essence of international law with all its defi ciencies and shortcomings -has conceded that the concept of armed humanitarian intervention as an exception to the prohibition to use force, wishful as it may be in the given case, simply did not form part of the existing law of nations as it stood at the time -and, in all likelihood, as it still stands today. 4 In another context he has also vigorously rejected the concept of a purported 'constitutionalisation' of international law, 5 a proposition that is nowadays so attractive to writers and scholars of international law. In particular, the idea of the Charter of the United Nations as a kind of 'world constitution' raises expectations for international law which it ultimately cannot live up to. To borrow concepts from municipal law, which often have only a small common denominator on a comparative basis, and transfer and apply them to international law without adequately refl ecting on the totally different structural realities of the latter, is a delusion dangerous to the credibility of the discipline of international law and probably even of the international legal order as such.
But the call for a realistic appraisal of what international law can achieve and what it cannot is, to be sure, not limited to the theory and doctrine of international law. Often it is also the practice of international law that acts in a manner lacking an adequate sense of reality. A good example of a concept that is in need of a realistic approach is that concerning the prohibition to use force in international relations and the handling of the concept of selfdefence; and since Professor Zemanek has had a say on this fundamental 
